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HAS

O U D E

BEEN

WORSE GOVERNED BY ITS NATIVE PRINCES

THAN

OUR INDIAN TERRITORIES BY LEADENHALL
STREET ?

BY MALCOLM LEWIN, Esq.

LATE SECOND JUDGE OF THE SUDDR COURT OF MADRAS.

“ The moderation of England is not unlike the ambition of other Nations.”

DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

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THIS inquiry addressed to OUDE, as the last of our Indian annexations, discloses but little to distinguish it from other annexations, except in the magnitude of the gain, and the amount of the hypocrisy employed to cover the spoliation. Whether considered as a measure of political expediency or as one founded on the *holy* object of interference for the benefit of the people, in either case a justification will be sought in vain. On examining the grounds on which we have deprived the ancient sovereigns of India of their thrones and territory, we find the motive in all cases the same. Lust of revenue and extension of empire, are the only influences visible in our proceedings.

My purpose on this occasion is to compare the condition of OUDE in its police and revenue administration with that of the territories under the sway of Leadenhall Street, and to point to the grounds on which the East India Company attempt to justify the seizure—leaving it to the

more curious to satisfy themselves as to the results of our alliance with other native states, such as Mysoor, Hyderabad, Nagpoor, Surat, Sattarah, &c., and then to inquire whether the territories of OUDE at the present time present a worse political condition than our own. Lord Dalhousie describes the kingdom of OUDE, as “one of the most fertile regions of the globe;” on another occasion he speaks of it as “well cultivated, and its soil richer than any I have seen in any of our own districts.” General Low, a late British resident at the Court of OUDE, speaks of “the immense profit that will be acquired from the possession of the OUDE territories.” Mill, in his history of India, states that “the revenue of OUDE before its connection with the English, exceeded three millions sterling, that subsequently it did not exceed half that sum, and in subsequent years fell far below it.”

Whether the value of OUDE was the motive of the spoliation or otherwise, its wealth was an object of sufficient importance to stimulate the ambition of a Governor-General of the present day, as it did the cupidity of a more celebrated Viceroy, about a century ago. When contrasting the past with the present treatment of OUDE by the Indian Government, General Low observes, “For my own part although our earlier connection with OUDE affairs in the unreformed times of Warren Hastings, suggests more than

“ one salient point for an Englishman to grieve
 “ over, I believe that our later Protectorate has
 “ been still more culpable.”

The revenues of OUDE, from the earliest period of our alliance with it, have been the milch-cow of our Indian Empire. A threat to take possession of the country has always been found capable of extorting the sums required for the exigencies of the Indian Government, whether for war or for patronage. Our exactions have exhausted its resources, our subsidiary forces have maintained the king in his misrule against his own subjects, and turning his army into a *sans culotte* rabble; have brought the finest district in the world into a state of poverty and depression, only to be amended by casting off a parasitical protection, as fatal to the country as it has been to our own national character.

A late Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck, speaking of the loans received from the King of OUDE, calls them “ unwilling contributions ex-
 “ torted by fear of our power.” Of our subsidiary forces, the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, remarks,—“ were it not for the constant presence of
 “ British troops at Lucknow, the people of OUDE
 “ would speedily work their own deliverance, and
 “ would impose on their ruler that effectual check
 “ of general revolt by which Eastern rulers are
 “ best controlled.” It is not necessary to multiply authorities in proof of the value acquired by the

seizure of OUDE,—as well might the value of a purse of gold be made a question by a robber ; the difference between the two is that the acquisition of the gold, though unlawful, is not associated with the hypocritical pretence of conferring benefits,—in this respect the robber takes higher ground than the Indian Viceroy,—he has but one crime to atone for.

Our views of humanity towards the Natives of India seldom find expression ; but when there is something to be gained by them, we then assume the character of the *qui tām* informer, who pleads for the interests of others, while intent only on securing his own.

The alliance of the British Government with OUDE, dates so far back as a century ago. OUDE has ever since had a subsidiary force, officered by Englishmen, and a British Minister has resided at the Court of the Sovereign, who, “ by treaty, was “ bound to govern according to his advice.” The police and revenue administration of the country has, for the most part, been conducted by officers chosen by the Indian Government from the civil and military services of the East India Company, and the country has practically been under our own management ; so that if its condition be such as to furnish a plea for its seizure, the blame belongs to the Indian Government and its agents, and to them alone.

Of the results of our connection with OUDE, the

Court of Directors observe in their dispatch to the Government of India, dated 1st October, 1828, “ Had it not been for our connection with OUDE, “ although misrule might have attained as great a “ height, it would not have been of equal duration. “ It is the British Government that, by a systematic “ suppression of all attempts at resistance, has “ prolonged, to the present time, a state of dis- “ organisation, which can nowhere attain per- “ manence, except where the shortsightedness and “ rapacity of a semi-barbarous government is “ armed with the military strength of a civilised “ one.” Lord William Bentinck ascribed the misrule of OUDE “ to the system under which there “ is a pageant king, and a British resident clothed “ with a degree of state equal to that of royalty “ itself, acting the part rather of a schoolmaster “ and dictator than of the minister of a friendly “ power, exercising a jurisdiction totally incom- “ patible with the royal dignity and authority. He “ thought it would be more for the comfort of the “ Sovereign, for the advantage of good government, “ and for the interests of both, that the Sovereign “ should be relieved from this more than king.” Is it surprising that a country under such conditions should be mis-governed ? that its king, instead of being the energetic ruler of his people, should cast off a governing power which he could not exercise without bringing himself into collision with the Viceroy appointed by the Governor-

General to rule over him? That, failing in the real attributes of kingly power, and surrounded by temptation, he should devote himself to other and less dignified pursuits?

Warren Hastings, speaking of our conduct in Oude, remarks, “the numbers, influence, and enormous amount of the salaries, pensions, and emoluments of the Company’s service, civil and military, in the Vizier’s service, have become an intolerable burthen upon the revenue and authority of his Excellency, and exposed us to the envy and resentment of the whole country, by excluding the native servants and adherents of the Vizier from the rewards of their services and attachment.” One object has guided the Indian Government in its alliance with the native states of India, holding that steadily in view, each state has gradually declined, each has sooner or later furnished a pretext for its own extinction. Few native states have escaped our grasp, and these few are marked out for destruction. Experience abundantly proves that the best ordered are insecure, where anything is to be gained by taking possession of them.

It is remarkable that whenever the Indian treasury has been low, the wrongs of Oude have been more prominent than at other times, we have then put forth our pious aspirations for the welfare of the people—it was the piety of the highwayman, which commencing with “Your money or your

“ life,” ceased as soon as the demand was satisfied—the people whose name was invoked for the occasion were then left to their fate. Lord Hastings, when Governor-General, adverting to the low ebb of the Indian treasury, during the Mahrattah war, says, “ The treasuries of the three presidencies “ were in so unfurnished a condition, that the “ sufficiency of funds in them to meet any un- “ usual charges, and many menaced us, excited “ considerable uneasiness. At that period the “ low credit of the bonds which had at different “ times been issued, as the securities for monies “ borrowed, made eventual recurrence to a loan “ seriously discouraging in contemplation. Luckily “ I was on such frank terms with the Nabob, as “ that I could frankly explain to him my circum- “ stances, so that the Honourable Company was “ accommodated with above two and a half mil- “ lions sterling, on my simple receipt.”

The circumstance we are here called upon to remark is that while we were incessantly reproaching the Nawaub with his lavish expenditure in luxury, “ with the effects of an expensive “ government, the oppression and misery of his “ people,” complaining of the wretched condition of his unpaid army, and threatening him with the loss of his kingdom, we should not have scrupled so late as the year 1842 to borrow large sums of money from him. In a letter dated 21st January, 1842, the British resident, Colonel Low, states,

“ adverting to the exaggerated rumours of our
 “ reverses in Affghanistan, and of their supposed
 “ effects, such rumours rendering it desirable to
 “ shew to the native community, that the confi-
 “ dence of the OUDE government in our stability
 “ remains unabated, I thought it desirable to
 “ make use of my personal influence with the
 “ King of OUDE to induce him to lend a consider-
 “ able sum of money to the Government of India.
 “ I explained to his Majesty, and stated to him
 “ frankly, that there was a temporary difficulty in
 “ procuring supplies, and I said he could not in
 “ any way evince his good will and gratitude to
 “ the British Government more appropriately than
 “ by subscribing largely to the loan now open.
 “ Nothing could be more satisfactory than the
 “ way in which the king received this intimation
 “ of my wishes. He declared in an earnest and
 “ cordial manner, that it gave him great pleasure
 “ to carry my wishes into effect, and that he was
 “ at all times ready to do so, that he would wil-
 “ lingly subscribe all the money he could possibly
 “ spare, without the least delay; adding, that in
 “ two or three days he would send to my treasury
 “ at least ten lacs of rupees, which sum was some
 “ days after made up to fourteen lacs.” The total
 sum lent by the Nawaub to the British Govern-
 ment in 1842, to relieve it from the pressure of
 the Affghan war, was forty-six lacs of rupees.

Our alliance with the Princes of OUDE has for a

series of years been little more than a series of extortion; when weak we have soothed them, when power was in our hands we have threatened, keeping always in view the fate of the victim, until circumstances should concur to favour the opportunity. This opportunity did at length arrive, that too within a few years of the loan just referred to. Lord Dalhousie, writing on the 21st November, 1854, says: “ The occurrence of successive wars and an unfeigned reluctance to have recourse to extreme measures, have concurred to induce the Government of India to take no action on the warning given to the King seven years ago. I would now instruct the resident Colonel Outram to apply himself on his arrival at Lucknow, to an inquiry into the present state of the country.” The pear was now ripe; India was quiet—there was no Mahratta confederacy—no Affghan war—no Seikh war to oppose our plucking it. We had no longer an object to serve by conciliation—we could count upon our power—the victim was within our grasp. We had hitherto been satisfied with the goose’s egg, the time was come to seize the goose itself. Setting out with a foregone conclusion, a report was called for to justify it. In reply to the requisition Colonel Outram informed the Governor-General,—“ I am of course entirely dependent for any information, on what I find in the Residency Records.” It was impossible the Resident should furnish any thing in justification of

the measure, that was not already in the hands of the Governor-General; the inquiry ordered was a mere mockery, an attempt to cover a deliberate act of spoliation, and to throw the onus of it on a man of character who, newly appointed to the office, was without the means of judging where he was called upon to decide the fate of a kingdom.

The historian Mill informs us, that during many years “unjustifiable extortions, to the extent of “thirty-four lacs per annum, had been practised “on that independent Prince.” Bishop Heber says, “The King lent the British Government all “that would have enabled him to ease the people “of their burdens;” referring to another loan he remarks—“Of the two millions which his father “had left, the King had lent one to Lord Hastings “to carry on the Nepaul war. For this he was to “receive interest, but unfortunately for him he “accepted instead of all payment a grant of fresh “territory under the Himalaya mountains, which “is unproductive, being either a savage wilderness “or occupied by a race of mountaineers, who pay “no taxes without being compelled to do so, and “he had not the means of compelling them.” It would seem a strange policy to make over to the King of Oude the distant territory of another, while we were ever reproaching him with being unable to manage his own.

With the constantly recurring demands of the Indian Government on the Oude treasury, it is

not surprising that the revenues of the country should be found insufficient to meet the ordinary charges of Government—that the King should be unable to defray the expenses of his army—that under the confused and vacillating system of internal administration established by us, crimes should go unpunished and unrepressed—and lastly, that those results should display themselves which naturally arose out of the vicious system we had devised and forced upon the King, as the certain means of his destruction. It still remains to be seen whether OUDE was worse governed by the Nawaub than our own territories by Leadenhall Street.

Had the misrule of OUDE produced the fruits ascribed to it, we should hear of the emigration of the inhabitants, which is expressly denied—we should hear of robberies and murder, of torture, and other crimes transcending the number to be met with in other parts of India. So far from this being the case, we find the magistrates of Jounpore and Gorukpore, Major Troup, commanding the 2nd regiment of OUDE Light Infantry, Captain Bunbury and others, bearing favourable testimony to the state of the police of OUDE. In his minute of the 15th August, 1855, General Low states, “ In all those measures which relate exclusively to
 “ the interest of the paramount state, such as
 “ searching for and giving up criminals, who have
 “ escaped into OUDE, from our provinces, supplying

“ our troops when marching through OUDE, pro-
 “ tecting our mails, &c., the Government of OUDE
 “ has always been and is up to this day unusually
 “ attentive and efficient. I can further truly re-
 “ mark that the Kings of OUDE have co-operated
 “ most actively and efficiently with us in capturing
 “ Thugs and Dacoits. I may as well here mention
 “ the fact that during the Nepaul war, the King
 “ of OUDE lent us free of all cost 300 elephants;
 “ the aid thus obtained, for conveying our artillery,
 “ ammunition, and tents, &c., in our mountain
 “ warfare, was of immense value to us, and of a
 “ kind which it was totally out of our power to
 “ obtain in any other manner, or from any other
 “ quarter.” The wonder is that General Low
 should have consented to the destruction of such
 an ally, that in common with the seventeen direc-
 tors who protested against the seizure of Sattarah,
 he should not have thrown his shield over the
 man, who alone of all the princes of India had
 stood by us in times of peril—that under the
 treaty of 1837, made with the King, he should
 not have preferred to see his country put into com-
 mission. But this would have interfered with the
 plan of immediate annexation; the treaty was
 therefore annulled, a fact of which the King was
 not apprized until the day had arrived when it
 should be made known to him that his kingdom
 had departed from him. The Government of India
 is despotic, and it was perhaps a safer card for

Leadenhall Street, to yield to the ambition of an all-powerful Governor-General, than to stand in the way of the openly-avowed policy of his administration.

Amidst the many vices imputed to the Oude Government, we find no testimony that in the collection of its revenues and in the detection of crime torture was systematic and habitual; nor is there anything in proof that a greater amount of crime is to be found in Oude than in the East India Company's territories; nor is it alleged that more crimes pass undetected and unpunished. In the eloquent, if not very judicious, speech lately addressed to the Students of Hayleybury, by the Chairman of the East India Company, Colonel Sykes, confines the blame of the practice of torture in Madras to the Native officials, and assumes it to have existed unknown to their European superiors, this too in the teeth of the testimony borne by the European Civil Service, who, when called upon, avowed their knowledge of the practice, many of them declaring it a necessary means of revenue and successful judicial inquiry. It may be regretted that Colonel Sykes, who had done so much for the natives of India in his judicial statistics, was unmindful of the proverb,—“*quod factu foedum est, idem est et dictu turpe*,” and that he should have needlessly introduced to public notice a subject as odious to English ears as it is discreditable to his own body. The administration of justice is

nowhere alleged to be worse in Oude than it is shewn by Mr. Haliday, the Deputy-Governor of Bengal, in his recent minute, to be within our own districts, and it would not be possible, in the most barbarous country in the world, to discover anything more atrocious as a system than is laid open in the recent Report of the Commissioners, appointed by order of Parliament, to inquire into the practice of torture in the territories of Madras. Mr. Haliday shews that in our own districts of Bengal, the administration of justice is a mere farce and delusion. He says,—“ The village police are in a permanent
 “ state of starvation ; they are all thieves and
 “ robbers of necessity, or leagued with thieves and
 “ robbers, in so much that, when any one is robbed
 “ in a village, it is most probable that the first
 “ one suspected will be the village watchman ;”
 in another place he remarks,—“ Our criminal
 “ judicature does not command the confidence of
 “ the people,—the administration of justice is
 “ considered little better than a lottery.” The Madras Commissioners shew that the police and robbers of the country make common cause, that neither life nor property are secure, that torture is part of the system of Government, known and acknowledged as a necessary engine in revenue and police operations, and as regular and habitual in the public service, as any other part of its duties.

If for permitting a condition of things less

vicious than this under his government, if for carrying out a system of administration untainted by such atrocities, the Nawaub of Oude is deprived of his country, how much more is that penalty called for in the case of the Directors of the East India Company, who though appealed to and warned to set their house in order, turned a deaf ear to all remonstrance, and neglected to repair the most flagrant evils of their administration. The existence of systematic torture by their servants, and the corrupt state of their police, were brought to their notice by their provincial judges, in their Circuit Reports, and especially in a Report of the second Judge of the Centre Division, dated the 28th of September, 1840. The means of amendment were then pointed out, and fifteen years after were adopted without acknowledgment. The dispatch of the Court of Directors to the Madras Government, dated the 12th September, 1855, is the mere echo of the Report of their Circuit Judge, dated 28th September, 1840. The remedies suggested were left untried at the time, and would have been left unnoticed to the present day, but for the demands of Parliament, who forced the exposure on the Directors of the Company. With unlimited means of good government in their hands,—with means unfettered for enlarging the resources of the country, and adding to its wealth,—what measure of improvement is traceable to them? What have they done in arts, in science, in com-

merce? What in education? Have they not set their faces against all change, whether it denoted improvement or otherwise?

It is sufficient that it was change to assure their condemnation; few have ventured to expose the vices of their administration, as few to suggest remedies. The Report of 1840, already referred to, would have been deemed a hopeless and profitless task by its author, had there not been a Sullivan and Elphinstone at the seat of Government to assure it a liberal reception.

Although the spoliation of Oude has little more importance, abstractedly, than a similar act of injustice towards any other native prince, as the last act against a native state of magnitude and influence, it carries with it a peculiar interest, now that the course of Russia is towards the East. Though we may have little cause to fear the result of Russia's efforts, on the stability of our Indian Empire, we shall never secure the fruits of peace so long as our policy alienates the affections of the people, and makes them ever ready to open their arms to the invader. Our Indian Empire has not a friend left among the native princes once in alliance with it,—discontent is rife everywhere,—princes, nobles, and people, would, one and all, hail the advent of Russia, or of any other powerful state, as a saviour. With such thoughts uppermost in the minds of the people, it is as impossible that the country should ever be free from agitation

and war's alarms, as that there should be a sense of security compatible with improvement. We may be able to repel the invader, but the measures necessary for the purpose might be of a magnitude sufficient to exhaust our revenues.

The genius of our rule in India has been ably and aptly described in the letter of a native gentleman, recently addressed to me from Madras. He remarks, "It is right that I should refer to
 " the general feelings of the natives, in consequence of the late supersessions regarding the
 " adoption of heirs, and the dispossessing of the
 " Zemindars, whose property is immediately
 " bought up by the Government, by a mere
 " nominal payment, which bad feeling will certainly be increased, if the succession to the
 " Nawaubship of the Carnatic is set aside, in defiance of the many treaties with the Company,
 " guaranteeing its continuance in the family of the
 " present claimant. The kingdom of Tanjore has
 " just been seized in consequence of the death of
 " the Rajah, about twenty-two days after that of
 " the Nawaub. Oude, Hyderabad, and Travancore
 " are threatened with the earliest convenient
 " absorption, and the princes and nobility of the
 " country are in a fair way of general extinction,
 " till India will have no more than two classes,—
 " the English Government and the ryots." These sentiments pervade all India under British rule. The lands alluded to were sold for arrears of

revenue. Since the dispossession of the Zemindars, measures have been taken at the instance of the Home Authorities to reduce the land assessment to the extent of thirty per cent. The necessity of lowering the assessment had been often pointed out, but an arrear of revenue was the only legal means of depriving the Zemindar of his estate.

If it were possible to hold India against the good will of the people, to make permanent an empire whose foundation was the degradation of all classes of the inhabitants, then might our rule in India be secure. We have degraded the princes and nobles of the country, we have denied to the people rights and privileges which have been accorded by every conqueror in every part of the globe. It remains to be seen whether an ever-changing small body of Englishmen, scattered over the country with religious views and social habits in antagonism with the people, is capable of gaining a hold on their affections and of filling the vacuum created by the extinction of their natural superiors—the lords of the soil.

In spite of the systematic efforts of Leadenhall Street, to check the spread of knowledge in India, the distinction between a conquest made by Russia and a conquest made by England is not unknown, and were the opportunity to present itself, the people would not shew themselves unmindful of it. The "*divide et impera*" principle which raised our empire can no longer serve us ; in place of it we

have a bond of union, cemented by a common interest in our destruction. Every native prince has been weighed in the balance, and is well aware that sooner or later the lot will be drawn "*serius* "*ocius sors exitura*," which humbles him before his people, and forces him, as an outcast, from the inheritance of his ancestors.

Malte Brun, speaking of the conduct of Russia to her conquered subjects, remarks, "Le Gouvernement Russe respecte avec une politique éclairée, tous les droits acquis, tous les privilèges, de provinces, de villes, de classes. Les seuls changements que les peuples conquis éprouvent sont favorables à la liberté personnelle, industrielle, et religieuse." The converse proposition describes the genius of Leadenhall Street. Unlike Russia in her conquests, the Government of Leadenhall Street has ever been opposed to colonization. Grasping everything for itself, it has excluded British labour and capital from India, the one lest it should bring our countrymen into intercourse with the inhabitants, the other lest it should open out a field of commerce to the world.

Leaving to the natives nothing of the fruit but the husk, it has shut them out from all but the lowest offices in the state, and declaring the habits of the people, fixed and immutable, has opposed itself to education, rightly judging that an empire such as theirs could only subsist on ignorance. As the result of an administration two hundred years

old, we have the mass of the people in abject ignorance and in abject poverty. Excessive taxation has absorbed the capital of the country, so that even the small property of the peasantry, the jewels and personal ornaments of their females, have vanished at the call of the tax-gatherer.

The first insight acquired by the people of England into the East India Company's rule, was at the renewal of the Charter, in the year 1813. Great attempts were then made to baffle inquiry, and the means resorted to were in part successful. The year 1832 was the next important era of inquiry, and from this period it may be dated that the eyes of the people of England were opened to the wants of India, and that they saw in her a nation worn down by the oppression of her rulers. The last ten years have been actively employed in measures of improvement, and more has been done in this brief interval, in contrast with the past, than in the half century which preceded them. The Act recently passed for the Government of India, which makes the Directors tenants at will, instead of leaseholders for a term of twenty years, provides a potent check against jobbery and misrule, and the appointment to the body of the Directors, by the Crown, shews that Parliament is fully alive to their short comings. The closer subjection of the Indian Governments to the paramount power, in place of continuing them under the authority of a body of merchants, bankers, lawyers, and non-

descripts, will aid in reconciling the people of India to a foreign rule, hitherto neither intelligible as a government, nor capable in any case of affording the means of redress. It remains but to return the very meagre authority still left in the Court of Directors to the more efficient hands of the British Government, the only source of improvement, and the only barrier against Indian misrule. Even under the old régime the power of the Court of Directors was in subserviency to the Board of Control. So much so that Lord Ellenborough, as President, arrogated to himself the entire jurisdiction of the Indian Government, “ I know when I was at the Board of Control, I “ conducted the Government, there is no doubt “ about that;” the Court of Directors are elsewhere described as “ the mere cloak of the irre- “ sponsible despotism of the minister, as a source “ of injury to India and of danger to England.” By the new régime the Court of Directors have lost one of the main attributes of government, viz. —the power of appointing their own servants, so that no one can enter their Civil, Military, and Medical Services without first passing an examination by Commissioners appointed by the Crown; nor can they appoint their own Law Officer, nor the members of Council of the local governments, without the consent of the Crown, which possesses authority to dismiss at its pleasure any one of their servants. Of the Court of Proprietors little need

be said; let them reflect on the men they have chosen to govern India,—on the motive of their votes,—shall two such bodies be preserved? Never have two bodies so completely worked out their own destruction! Never have two bodies more justly merited the fate that awaits them.

The East India Company's charter of 1832, provides a sum of £.5000 to be expended on education in the territories, under the Madras Presidency; of this amount, about £.3000 per annum have been recently expended in a collegiate school at Madras, which has given education to 160 pupils out of a population of twenty-two millions; the residue of the grant has been unemployed. In an interval of about the same duration, the Court of Directors expended out of the revenues of India a sum of £.53,000 in providing banquets for themselves and their supporters. If we except the Collegiate Institution at Madras, there is not a Government school over all the 140,000 square miles comprising the Madras territories.

Acting on the policy announced by Lord Dalhousie a few months after his arrival in India, that “it is not possible for any one to dispute the policy of taking advantage of any just opportunity for consolidating the territories that already belong to us, by taking possession of states that may lapse in the midst of them.” The dominions of the Rajah of Travancore come

next in the order of absorption. Looking at the past it is not more easy to decide in what consists a “just opportunity” than to describe the features of a state that has “lapsed.” Taking a practical view of the question, we may assume that any state has lapsed when it is thought an advantage that it should fall into the hands of the Governor-General; an argument that might well be applied to the case of the wretched creature, whom in virtue of a bill of sale by a late Viceroy Lord Hardinge, we placed on the throne of Cachmere, and have since supported in his excesses. Is it only with allies such as Goolab Sing that the English Government finds sympathy?

The condition of the Travancore state presents a favourable contrast with our own territories. Its sovereign, an enlightened Hindoo, has established schools throughout his dominions, and evinces his religious toleration by permitting the bible to be read in them. His courts of justice, modelled on those of the East India Company, are well ordered, the land assessment of his country is moderate, and his people are happy. In spite of a subsidiary force and other subsidies paid to the British Government, his treasury is well stocked—what more heinous crime in the eyes of an Indian Government?

The groundless pleas which have been urged for seizing the states of the native princes of India, have suggested a parallel to the press of India,

which has not inaptly been applied by it to the case of the King of Oude. “Thy country is
 “surpassing rich, thy father was a knave, thy
 “sister a harlot, thy mother a Cyprian, and thyself
 “a good-natured fool, is it surprising that under
 “the circumstances I killed thee?” Those of our Indian moralists who have paraded before the public the diaries of the fallen prince, and felt a blush of shame steal over them when luxuriating on the malicious and prurient tales of his debaucheries, would do well to peruse the domestic annals of other sovereigns, and in candour then ask themselves, whether among the princes of India is to be found a lower standard of morals than is on record against the kings and queens of Europe—“*Facile est opprimere innocentem.*”

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